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INTRODUCTION 
In Sell v. United States,1 the United States Supreme Court held 
that the Constitution allows the government to administer 
antipsychotic drugs involuntarily to a mentally ill criminal detainee in 
order to render that defendant competent to stand trial for serious, 
but nonviolent crimes.2  Drawing closely from the standards 
articulated in the earlier cases of Washington v. Harper3 and Riggins v. 
Nevada,4 the six-justice majority in Sell drew a four-part test5 for 
determining when the government may constitutionally involuntarily 
administer antipsychotic drugs to detainees for trial competency 
purposes when they are on trial for non-violent crimes, and have not 
been dangerous in the prison context.6  Specifically, the Court held: 
[T]he Constitution permits the Government involuntarily to 
administer antipsychotic drugs to a mentally ill defendant facing 
serious criminal charges in order to render that defendant 
competent to stand trial, but only if the [(1)] treatment is 
medically appropriate, [(2)] is substantially unlikely to have side 
effects that may undermine the fairness of the trial, and, [(3)] less 
intrusive treatments are unlikely to achieve substantially the same 
results, and the treatment is [(4)] necessary . . .  to further 
important governmental trial-related interests.7 
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 1 539 U.S. 166 (2003). 
 2 Id. at 169. 
 3 494 U.S. 210 (1990). 
 4 504 U.S. 127 (1992). 
 5 539 U.S. at 179. 
 6 Id. at 169. 
 7 Id. at 180-81. 
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In doing so, however, the Court suggested that lower courts 
should first consider whether involuntary medication is permissible 
on the ground that the detainee is dangerous.8  Alternatively, if the 
detainee is not dangerous, as a last resort, the Court maintains that 
the government could still involuntarily medicate these pre-trial 
detainees under the Sell standard.9 This Comment argues that this 
suggestion is problematic, for it leaves dangerous pre-trial detainees 
with little of the Sixth Amendment protections10 that the Sell four-part 
test provides non-violent detainees. 
What the Sell Court overlooked is that the Harper standard, 
which applies to violent inmates, was created for post-conviction prison 
inmates, where Sixth Amendment fair trial protections are not 
implicated.  By contrast, individuals like the detainees in Sell and 
Riggins are pre-trial detainees, which means that Sixth Amendment 
trial protections should apply.  The Sell standard properly takes Sixth 
Amendment concerns into account, whereas Harper does not.  The 
Sell Court, therefore, was wrong to instruct governments to attempt to 
involuntarily medicate pre-trial detainees under Harper because their 
Sixth Amendment rights will be ignored, and pre-trial detainees will 
be left to suffer antipsychotic drugs’ side effects that may alter the 
detainee’s demeanor and personality in ways that can prejudice facets 
of his defense.11 
Part I of this comment discusses the pre-existing standards in 
this area of law prior to Sell, focusing on the “dangerousness” test of 
Washington v. Harper and the trial competence test highlighted in 
Riggins v. Nevada.  Part II analyzes the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Sell v. United States, paying special attention to the nuances between 
the different courts’ decisions throughout the case’s procedural 
history. 
Among other things, Part III provides a discussion of the Sixth 
Amendment issues implicated in this situation, focusing primarily on 
the right to a fair trial, competency, courtroom appearance and 
 
 8 Id. at 182-83. 
 9 539 U.S. at 182-83. 
 10 The Sixth Amendment provides: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district 
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have 
been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature 
and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against 
him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, 
and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. 
U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 11 Riggins, 504 U.S. at 142-43 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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demeanor, and their effects on jury deliberations.  This section lays 
the groundwork for how the side effects of these antipsychotic drugs 
implicate Sixth Amendment concerns.  Further, Part III broadly 
discusses different regimens of antipsychotic drugs similar to those 
being implemented to patients suffering illnesses comparable to 
Charles Sell, their impact on the body, their curative tendencies, and 
the brutal side effects that oftentimes result. 
Lastly, Part III discusses the problem with Sell.  Although the Sell 
four-part test properly addresses the side effects of antipsychotic 
drugs and their oftentimes prejudicial impact on detainees’ Sixth 
Amendment concerns, the Court’s accompanying instructions on the 
test’s application are flawed.  The Sell Court should have limited 
Harper’s application to dangerous, post-conviction inmates only and 
should have instructed courts to apply the Sell standard to all pre-trial 
detainees.  Only then can all pre-trial detainees be guaranteed to 
have their Sixth Amendment trial rights weighed against the 
oftentimes devastating side effects of the drugs the government is 
attempting to forcefully administer to them.  To instruct otherwise, as 
the Sell Court has done, deprives individuals of their constitutional 
rights in favor of achieving an unfair conviction. 
I. PRE-EXISTING PRECEDENT FOR SELL:  
WASHINGTON V. HARPER AND RIGGINS V. NEVADA 
In Sell, the Supreme Court seemingly combined the rationale 
utilized in the Harper12 and Riggins13 decisions for determining when 
the government can involuntarily administer antipsychotic drugs to 
detainees, who are not dangerous in the prison environment, for trial 
competency purposes for non-violent crimes.14  A brief analysis of 
those two cases follows. 
A. Washington v. Harper 
In 1976, Walter Harper was sentenced to prison for robbery.15  
Harper was mentally ill and, while incarcerated, was administered 
antipsychotic drugs like Melaril.16  He was granted parole in 1980, 
conditioned upon his participation in psychiatric treatment.17  
 
 12 494 U.S. at 210.   
 13 504 U.S. at 127. 
 14 Sell, 538 U.S. at 177-79 (“Two prior precedents, Harper . . . and Riggins . . . set 
forth the framework for determining the legal answer.”). 
 15 Harper, 494 U.S. at 213. 
 16 Id. at 213-14 n.1. 
 17 Id. 
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Through 1981, he continued to receive psychiatric treatment until he 
assaulted two hospital nurses, and his parole was revoked.18  In 1982, 
after voluntarily receiving antipsychotic drugs for many years, Harper 
refused to continue taking the prescribed medications.19  Thereafter, 
according to procedure, the treating physician sought to medicate 
Harper over his objections.20  Harper filed suit claiming the 
institution’s policy to involuntarily administer the medication violated 
the Due Process, Equal Protection, and Free Speech Clauses of both 
the Federal and State constitutions.21  After seven years of hearings 
and appeals, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.22 
In Harper, the Court held that even though individuals have a 
“significant” constitutionally protected “liberty interest” in “avoiding 
the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs,”23 where the 
inmate is “dangerous” and based on the nature of the prison 
environment,24 states have a legitimate and important interest in 
forced medication.25 
Further, the Court stated, the Due Process Clause allows a prison 
inmate suffering from serious mental illness to be involuntary treated 
with antipsychotic drugs, “[(1)] if the inmate is dangerous to himself 
or others and [(2)] the treatment is in the inmate’s medical 
interest.”26  The Harper Court’s reasoning, which first recognized a 
constitutionally protected interest in the right to refuse medical 
treatment,27 revolved around such factors as Harper already being 
convicted and him being dangerous to inmates and staff because of a 
mental illness.28 
 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Harper, 494 U.S. at 217. 
 22 Id. at 218. 
 23 Id. at 221.  In Harper, the Supreme Court recognized for the first time that 
there is a constitutionally protected interest in the right to refuse medical treatment.  
Id. at 221-22.  
 24 Id. at 227. 
 25 Id. at 225. 
 26 Harper, 494 U.S. at 227. 
 27 Id. at 221-22. 
 28 See Dennis E. Cichon, The Right to “Just Say No”: A History and Analysis of the Right 
to Refuse Antipsychotic Drugs, 53 LA. L. REV. 283, 417 (1992).  Harper claimed the extent 
of a prisoner’s right to refuse “must be defined in the context of the inmate’s 
confinement.”  Harper, 494 U.S. at 222. 
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B. Riggins v. Nevada 
Unlike in Harper, where the convicted inmate was dangerous in 
the prison context, in Riggins, the defendant was a pre-trial detainee.29  
Riggins was awaiting trial for a violent crime—he had allegedly 
stabbed his victim repeatedly to death30 —and since Riggins suffered 
from mental illness, the government requested he be treated with 
Melaril for trial competency purposes.31  The State, relying on Nevada 
Revised Statute § 178.400 (1989), which allowed involuntary 
administration of antipsychotic drugs for trial competence purposes, 
put Riggins on trial.32  Riggins then moved to terminate the 
administration of the drugs, arguing the drugs “denied him the 
ability to assist in his own defense and prejudicially affected his 
attitude, appearance, and demeanor at trial,” and without the 
medication, Riggins would be incompetent, and therefore could not 
stand trial.33  In a one-page decision, giving no indication of the 
court’s rationale, the trial court denied the motion and subsequently, 
the State administered the drugs, Riggins was convicted, and 
sentenced to death.34 
In Riggins, the Court granted certiorari to decide whether 
involuntary administration of antipsychotic drugs during a detainee’s 
trial violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.35  Although the 
Court overturned Riggins’ conviction because the “district court 
allowed administration of Melaril to continue without making . . . any 
findings,”36 the Court stated it would have allowed the involuntary 
administration provided certain standards were followed.37  The 
Court stated that the “Fourteenth Amendment affords at least as 
much protection to persons the State detains for trial,”38 and 
although there exist no standards for judging involuntary 
administration of antipsychotic drugs in trial and pre-trial situations, 
the State “would have satisfied due process if the prosecution had 
demonstrated . . . that treatment with antipsychotic medication was 
medically appropriate and, considering less intrusive alternatives, 
 
 29 Riggins, 504 U.S. at 135. 
 30 Id. at 129. 
 31 Id. at 129-30. 
 32 Id. at 130. 
 33 Id. at 131. 
 34 Id. at 129-31.  Subsequently, the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed Riggins’ 
conviction and death sentence.  Riggins, 504 U.S. at 132. 
 35 Id. at 132-33. 
 36 Id. at 136 (emphasis in original). 
 37 Id. at 135. 
 38 Riggins, 504 U.S. at 135. 
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essential for the sake of Riggins’ own safety or the safety of others.”39  
Similarly, the Court added, the State “might have been able to 
justify . . . involuntary [drug] treatment . . . by establishing that it 
could not obtain an adjudication of Riggins’ guilt or innocence” of 
the murder charge “by using less intrusive means.”40 
II. SELL V. UNITED STATES 
In Sell, the factual background presented a novel situation to the 
Supreme Court—unlike Walter Harper, Charles Sell was not 
dangerous in the prison context so a Harper analysis alone was 
insufficient.  Similarly, unlike David Riggins, Charles Sell was awaiting 
trial for non-violent crimes so he did not fit neatly under the Court’s 
Riggins standard.  Thus, the Supreme Court needed to articulate a 
new standard to address the concerns Charles Sell’s case presented—
a  non-dangerous pre-trial detainee on trial for a non-violent crime. 
A. Sell: Factual Summary and Procedural History 
Sell, once a practicing dentist, had a long and unfortunate 
history of mental illness and in 1982, “after telling doctors that the 
gold he used for fillings had been contaminated by communists,” was 
hospitalized for psychotic tendencies, treated, and subsequently 
discharged.41  In 1984, Sell was hospitalized and again released after 
calling and requesting the police to shoot a leopard that was 
attempting to board a bus outside his office.42  Sell’s activity turned 
criminal in 1997 when he was charged with submitting fictitious 
insurance claims for payment, and shortly thereafter Sell and his wife 
were charged with “56 counts of mail fraud, 6 counts of Medicaid 
fraud, and 1 count of money laundering.”43  Then, at one point in 
1998, Sell was charged with the attempted murder of his arresting FBI 
 
 39 Id. (emphasis added). 
 40 Id.  Professor Cichon wrote in response to Riggins: 
Although the majority refused to mandate substantive criteria in 
Riggins, it did suggest a more rigorous standard of review for the 
involuntary medication of pretrial detainees than that articulated in 
Harper for convicted inmates.  Rather than deferring to a rational state 
interest as in Harper, the Court indicated that “safety considerations or 
other compelling concerns” must be asserted in order to override a 
pretrial detainee’s liberty interest in refusing antipsychotic drugs. 
Cichon, supra note 28, at 418-19. 
 41 Sell, 539 U.S. at 169-70 (quoting App. at 146). 
 42 Id. (citing App. at 148). 
 43 Id. (citing App. at 12-22).  At this time, Sell was held competent to stand trial 
by a federal magistrate judge, and was released on bail.  Id. (quoting App. at 321). 
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agent as well as a former co-worker who was planning to testify 
against Sell in the fraud case.44 
In 1999, after being found incompetent to stand trial by the 
magistrate, Sell moved for reconsideration and was ordered to be 
sent to the United States Medical Center for Federal Prisoners for up 
to four months to receive hospitalized treatment.45  During this time, 
the medical center staff recommended that Sell take antipsychotic 
medication, and soon sought to administer the drugs against his 
will.46  In August 2000, by court order, the magistrate authorized the 
involuntary administration of antipsychotic drugs to Sell but stayed 
the order allowing Sell to appeal the issue to the district court.47  In 
April 2001, although not affirming the decision based on the 
magistrate’s findings, the district court found the magistrate’s 
“dangerousness” determination clearly erroneous, and affirmed the 
use of the drugs for trial competency purposes.48 
Sell and the Government both appealed the district court’s 
decision, and in March 2002, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals 
affirmed.49  A divided panel affirmed the district court, holding that 
Sell was not dangerous,50 but declared that administering the drugs 
involuntarily to ensure Sell’s competence to stand trial was lawful 
because the “government has an essential interest in bringing a 
defendant to trial,” and there were no less intrusive means to do so.51  
Moreover, a majority of the Eighth Circuit found antipsychotic drug 
treatment “medically appropriate” for Sell and that with the drugs, 
there was a reasonable probability that Sell could participate in his 
trial.52 
 
 44 Id. (citing App. at 23-29).  The attempted murder charge was joined with the 
fraud charges for trial.  Id. 
 45 Sell, 539 U.S. at 170 (citing App. at 323). 
 46 Id. at 172 (citing App. at 323). 
 47 Id. at 173 (quoting App. at 333-34).  The magistrate found that Sell was such a 
danger to himself and others in the institution, that medication would be the only 
way to render him less dangerous, so the new drugs will ameliorate side effects, the 
drugs’ benefits outweigh the risks, and the drugs have a substantial probability of 
returning Sell to competency.  Id. 
 48 Id. at 173-74 (quoting App. at 349, 349 n.5, 354). 
 49 Sell, 539 U.S. at 173-74  (citing United States v. Sell, 282 F.3d 560 (8th Cir. 
2002)). 
 50 Sell, 282 F.3d at 565 (referring to an incident Sell had with a nurse at the 
medical center, the Eight Circuit held his behavior at the medical center, at the 
most, amounted to an “‘inappropriate familiarity and even infatuation’ with a 
nurse”). 
 51 Id. at 568. 
 52 Sell, 539 U.S. at 174-75 (citing Sell, 282 F.3d at 571-72). 
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The United States Supreme Court “granted certiorari to 
determine whether the Eighth Circuit ‘erred in rejecting’ Sell’s 
argument that ‘allowing the government to administer antipsychotic 
medication against his will solely to render him competent to stand 
trial for non-violent offenses,’ . . . improperly depriv[ed] Sell of an 
important ‘liberty’ that the Constitution guarantees.”53  The six-justice 
majority held that the Constitution authorizes the government to 
administer antipsychotic drugs involuntarily to a mentally ill criminal 
detainee in order to render that defendant competent to stand trial 
for serious, but non-violent crimes.54  Justice Breyer, writing for the 
majority, drew from Harper and Riggins a four-part test for 
determining those instances in which the government can 
involuntarily administer antipsychotic drugs to detainees for trial 
competency purposes when they are not dangerous in the prison 
context.55  The Court stated: 
[T]he Constitution permits the Government involuntarily to 
administer antipsychotic drugs to a mentally ill defendant facing 
serious criminal charges in order to render that defendant 
competent to stand trial, but only if the [(1)] treatment is medically 
appropriate, [(2)] is substantially unlikely to have side effects that may 
undermine the fairness of the trial, and, [(3)] less intrusive treatments 
are unlikely to achieve substantially the same results, and the 
treatment is [(4)] necessary . . . to further important governmental trial-
related interests.56 
Justice Breyer cautioned, however, that situations where the 
government could utilize the standard “solely for trial competence 
purposes . . . may be rare.”57 
The first element requires a court to find “that important 
governmental interests are at stake.”58  Under this prong, the Court 
recognized the existence of an important governmental interest in 
bringing an individual, whether being accused of a serious crime 
against the person or property, to trial.59  The Court declared that 
lower courts must engage in case-by-case factual determinations in 
evaluating the government’s interest because certain circumstances 
 
 53 Id. at 175 (quoting Petitioner’s Brief at I, Sell (No. 02-5664); U.S. CONST. 
amend. V) (citations omitted). 
 54 Sell, 539 U.S. at 169. 
 55 Id. at 178-79. 
 56 Id. at 179-80 (emphasis added). 
 57 Id. at 180. 
 58 Id. (emphasis in original). 
 59 Id. (citing Riggins, 504 U.S. at 135-36) (“In both instances the Government 
seeks to protect through application of the criminal law the basic human need for 
security.”). 
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may lessen the importance of the interest in bringing the detainee to 
trial.60  For example, the interest in bringing the defendant to trial 
might be lessened in situations where civil commitment is an 
alternative option to incarceration without a criminal trial.61  Justice 
Breyer warned the “potential for future confinement affects, but does 
not totally undermine, the strength of the need for prosecution.”62  
The Court, however, warned, the “Government has a concomitant, 
constitutionally essential interest in assuring that the defendant’s trial 
is a fair one.”63 
During step two of the analysis, the “court must conclude that 
involuntary medication will significantly further those concomitant 
state interests,” of prong one.64  Here, the court is required to 
determine that the antipsychotic “drugs . . . [are] substantially likely 
to render the defendant competent to stand trial” as well as find that 
the medication(s) are “substantially unlikely to have side effects that will 
interfere significantly with the defendant’s ability to assist counsel in 
conducting a trial defense, thereby rendering the trial unfair.”65  In 
this step, the majority cited Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Riggins, 
voicing the Sixth Amendment concerns of presentation in the 
courtroomlike in-court demeanor, behavior, manner, facial 
expressions, emotional responses, and their impression on the jury.66  
Moreover, Justice Kennedy discussed how antipsychotic drugs 
prejudice the defendant by rendering him unable, and sometimes 
too lethargic, to assist counsel in his defense.67 
Step three requires the court to “conclude that involuntary 
medication is necessary to further those [state] interests.”68  In other 
words, the court must conclude “that any alternative, less intrusive 
treatments are unlikely to achieve substantially the same results . . . ,” 
 
 60 Sell, 539 U.S. at 180. 
 61 Id. (“The defendant’s failure to take drugs voluntarily . . . may mean lengthy 
confinement in an institution for the mentally ill . . . [that] would diminish the risks 
that ordinarily attach to freeing without punishment one who has committed a 
serious crime.  We do not mean to suggest that civil commitment is a substitute for a 
criminal trial.  The Government has a substantial interest in timely prosecution.”). 
 62 Id. (“The same is true of the possibility that the defendant has already been 
confined for a significant amount of time (for which he would receive credit toward 
any sentence ultimately imposed, see 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b)).”). 
 63 Id. at 181. 
 64 Id. (emphasis added). 
 65 Id. (citing Riggins, 504 U.S. at 142-45 (Kennedy, J., concurring)) (emphasis 
added). 
 66 Sell, 539 U.S. at 181 (citing Riggins, 504 U.S. at 142-45 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring)). 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. 
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including, “less intrusive means for administering the drugs, e.g., a 
court order to the defendant backed by the contempt power, before 
considering more intrusive methods.”69 
Last, in step four, the “court must conclude that administration 
of the drugs is medically appropriate” for the detainees’ situation.70  The 
Court noted that antipsychotic drugs may have differing success rates 
and may cause different side effects, so within this prong, the 
medication must be “in the patient’s best medical interest in light of 
his medical condition,”71 and also, the “specific kinds of drugs at issue 
may matter here as elsewhere.”72 
In terms of application, the Court noted that the Sell four-part 
test only deals with the competency to stand trial and suggested that 
courts need not consider these factors when the individual’s 
dangerousness is the issue, like in Harper.73  The Court stated that 
employing Sell protections should be used as a last resort, claiming, 
“[t]here are often strong reasons for a court to determine whether 
forced administration of drugs can be justified on these alternative 
grounds before turning to the [Sell] question,”74 and moreover, Justice 
Breyer stated, the dangerousness test is usually more “objective and 
manageable . . .  [and] a court . . .  should ordinarily determine 
whether the Government [seeks or has first sought] permission for 
forced administration of drugs on these other Harper-type grounds; 
and, if not, why not.”75  Further, he stated, the “need to consider 
 
 69 Id. (emphasis added).  In this prong, the majority cites the Amicus Curiae Brief 
for the American Psychological Association that states, “nondrug therapies may be 
effective in restoring psychotic defendants to competence.”  Id.  The Court also cites 
the Amicus Curiae Brief for the American Psychiatric Association that states, 
“alternative treatments for psychosis commonly not as effective as medication,” which 
contrasts the American Psychological Association brief.  Id. 
 70 Sell, 539 U.S. at 181 (emphasis in original). 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. at 181. 
 73 Id. at 181-82. 
 74 Id. (emphasis in original). 
 75 Sell, 539 U.S. at 182-83 (quoting Riggins, 504 U.S. at 140).  Under the less 
protective Harper standard, the state can medicate a detainee against his will if 1) the 
inmate displays an amount of “dangerousness” to himself or others and, 2) the 
treatment is within the medical interest of the inmate.  Harper, 494 U.S. at 227.  Sell 
offers substantially more protection to the detainees, requiring the court to find that 
1) important governmental interests are at stake, 2) the medication will significantly 
further those interests, 3) involuntary medication is necessary to further those 
interests, and 4) the administration of the drugs must be medically appropriate for 
the patient.  Sell, 539 U.S. at 180-81 (citing Riggins, 504 U.S. at 140 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring)).  The Sell court cited Justice Kennedy’s Riggins concurrence incorrectly 
in this context.  Kennedy did not suggest that alternative means to involuntarily 
administer the drugs should be employed first before a Sell-like inquiry.  In Riggins, 
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authorization on trial competence grounds will likely disappear” if 
the Court were to authorize the medication on “alternative 
grounds,”76 and the “medical experts may find it easier to provide an 
informed opinion about whether, given the risk of side effects, 
particular drugs are medically appropriate and necessary to control a 
patient’s potentially dangerous behavior . . . than to try to balance 
harms and benefits related to the more quintessentially legal 
questions of trial fairness and competence.”77 
B. Standard Applied to Charles Sell: The Decision 
Sell’s administrative Medical Center hearing and the federal 
magistrate’s hearing approved the involuntary administration of 
antipsychotic drugs to Sell on the Harper “dangerousness” grounds 
alone.78  In contrast, the district court and the Eighth Circuit found 
the court’s application of the “dangerousness” standard clearly 
erroneous, adopting a Riggins rationale, and agreed that the drugs 
could be administered solely to render Sell competent enough to 
stand trial even though he was not dangerous to himself or others.79  
Although the Supreme Court voiced its discomfort with the Eighth 
Circuit’s conclusion that Sell was not “dangerous,” the Supreme 
Court assumed the Eighth Circuit’s decision was correct because the 
Government did not contest the matter on appeal.80 
 
he simply made reference to the distinction between the two sets of inquiries and 
how they both fit certain circumstances.  Riggins, 504 U.S. at 140 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (“This is not a case like [Harper], in which the purpose of the 
involuntary medication was to ensure that the incarcerated person ceased to be a 
physical danger to himself or others.  The inquiry in that context is both objective 
and manageable.  Here, [in Riggins] the purpose of the medication is not merely to 
treat a person with grave psychiatric disorders and enable that person to function 
and behave in a way not dangerous to himself or others, but rather to render the 
person competent to stand trial.”). 
 76 Sell, 539 U.S. at 183. 
 77 Id. at 182.  Even further in this vain, according to the majority, the Court 
would prefer to remove this whole inquiry away from the criminal realm and into the 
civil realm when possible.  Justice Breyer suggests that the Harper inquiry is equated 
with “medical treatment as a civil matter” and every state provides avenues through 
which the involuntary administration of medication can be authorized, and if a court 
were to authorize “medication on these alternative grounds, the need to consider 
authorization on trial competence grounds will likely disappear.”  Id. at 182-83 
(citing 28 CFR § 549.43 (2002); ALA. CODE §§ 26-2A-102(a), 26-2A-105, 26-2A-108 
(Michie 1992); ALASKA STAT. §§ 13.26.105(a), 13.26.116(b) (2002); ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 14-5303, 14-5312 (West 1995); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 28-65-205, 28-65-301 
(1987)). 
 78 Sell, 539 U.S. at 183. 
 79 Id. at 184. 
 80 Id. at 184 (“If anything, the record before us, described in Part I, suggests the 
contrary.”). 
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The Supreme Court held that although it could have approved 
the antipsychotic drugs for trial competency purposes if it met the 
new Sell standard, the Eighth Circuit incorrectly approved the 
administration of drugs to Sell because the government failed to 
meet that standard.81  The Court was concerned with the lack of 
breadth of the discussion at the federal magistrate’s hearing, which 
focused mostly on Sell’s “dangerousness,” and left unmentioned most 
of the factors articulated in the new four-part test.82  Moreover, the 
Supreme Court noted as problematic the hearing record’s absence of 
meaningful discussion about the drugs’ side effects, the drugs’ 
adverse effects on communication with counsel, the drugs’ chances of 
sedating the defendant, and the drugs’ impact on quelling detainees’ 
expressive emotions after courtroom trial developments, stating these 
concerns tend to undermine the fairness of trial and are all 
considerations under the new Sell standard.83  Additionally, the Court 
questioned why the lower court did not address the fact that Sell 
would not be a threat to the community because he had already been 
confined at the Medical Center and will continue to be held there if 
he does not take the medication.84  For these reasons, the majority 
vacated and remanded the Eighth Circuit’s judgment so the 
government could pursue forced medication on either the Sell 
articulated factors, the Harper dangerousness grounds, or both.85 
 
 81 Id. at 185. 
 82 Id. at 185. 
 83 Id. (citing Riggins, 504 U.S. at 142-45 (Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
 84 Sell, 539 U.S. at 186. 
 85 Id.  Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Thomas and O’Connor dissented, 
primarily disagreeing with the majority’s finding that the issue on appeal falls within 
the collateral order doctrine.  Id. at 186-87 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Justice Scalia did 
not believe there was a final judgment, and because of this, the Court of Appeals 
should not have heard the appeal.  Id.  The dissent claimed Sell’s pretrial order did 
not fit neatly under the collateral order doctrine test because the issue failed element 
three which is: “‘(3) effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.’”  Id. 
at 189 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 468).  Justice 
Scalia determined that Sell’s “order is reviewable on appeal from conviction and 
sentence,” and therefore the petitioner will have to wait until after the final 
judgment to appeal a “postdeprivation vacatur of conviction” as opposed to a 
“predeprivation injunction.”  Sell, 539 U.S. at 189-90 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Calling it 
a “breathtaking expansion of appellate jurisdiction over collateral orders,” Justice 
Scalia warned that the majority’s decision seemingly will allow criminal defendants to 
engage in opportunistic behavior by allowing them to refuse their medication 
halfway through their trial, and demanding “an interlocutory appeal from the order 
that medication continue on a compulsory basis.”  Id. at 191 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
Further, Justice Scalia believed the correct procedural avenue Sell should have taken 
would have been to obtain a “pre-trial review of the . . . medication order by filing 
suit under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 et. seq.,” or by filing a 
Bivens “action, which is available to federal pretrial detainees challenging the 
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III. SELL ESSENTIALLY INSTRUCTS LOWER COURTS TO IGNORE 
DETAINEES’ SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS. 
A. Competence, the Constitution, and Involuntary Medication to 
Render Competence 
It is a common thread of American jurisprudence that the 
conviction of an incompetent defendant violates due process.86  
Incompetency, or insufficient mental capacity, has been defined as 
whether or not the defendant could rationally consult with counsel 
and whether or not he rationally and factually understands the 
proceedings.87  A competency determination alone is not sufficient to 
guard against an unfair trial, but competency is necessary “because 
the elements of a fair trial presuppose, and depend upon, mental 
competence.”88  Obviously, the government has a constitutional 
requirement to render criminal detainees competent to stand trial 
and the involuntary administration of antipsychotic drugs to 
detainees for that purpose raises many Sixth Amendment concerns.89 
Generally, the Sixth Amendment ensures that defendants in 
criminal prosecutions “be informed of the nature and cause of the 
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have 
the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”90  The Supreme Court has 
 
conditions of their confinement . . . .” Id. at 193 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Bivens 
v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)). 
 86 See Vickie L. Feeman, Note, Reassessing Forced Medication of Criminal Defendants 
in Light of Riggins v. Nevada, 35 B.C. L. REV. 681, 704 (1994) (citing Dusky v. United 
States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960)). 
 87 Id. 
 88 William P. Ziegelmueller, Supreme Court Review: Sixth Amendment-Due Process on 
Drugs: The Implications of Forcibly Medicating Pretrial Detainees With Antipsychotic Drugs: 
Riggins v. Nevada, 112 S. Ct. 1810 (1992), 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 836, 846 
(1993). 
 89 See Riggins, 504 U.S. at 142 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The side effects of 
antipsychotic drugs may alter demeanor in a way that will prejudice all facets of the 
defense.  Serious due process concerns are implicated when the State manipulates 
the evidence in this way.”). 
 90 U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see also M. Catherine Healy, Comment, Riggins v. 
Nevada: Are “Synthetically Sane” Criminal Defendants Competent to Stand Trial?,” 20 NEW 
ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 385, 407 (1994).  These Sixth Amendment 
rights have been incorporated to state courts through the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment thus further providing, “the fundamental elements of 
fairness in a criminal trial.”  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see also Healy, supra note 90, at 
408 (quoting Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 818 (1975) (announcing “because 
these rights are basic to our adversary system of criminal justice, they are part of the 
‘due process of law’ [sic] that is guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to 
defendants in the criminal courts of the States”)). 
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held that one “accused of a crime is entitled to have his guilt or 
innocence determined solely on the basis of the evidence introduced 
at trial, and not on grounds of official suspicion, indictment, 
continued custody, or other circumstances not adduced as proof at 
trial.”91  Along this rationale, the Court held that a defendant may be 
prejudiced if he appears before a jury bound and gagged.92  Similarly, 
in Estelle v. Williams,93 the Court held that a state cannot require 
defendants to be tried while wearing prison uniforms.94 
The drugs’ effect on a detainee’s in-court demeanor is a major 
concern; a defendant on drugs, who appears in a trance-like state or 
is suffering from spastic body movements like lip smacking and 
involuntary pelvic movements95 will likely have a prejudicial effect on 
the jury.  Commentators maintain that frequent use of the 
antipsychotic drug Mellaril makes defendants “stoned for all practical 
purposes and [they] can barely function.”96 
Along these lines, the Supreme Court has held that if a 
defendant cannot actively cooperate with his lawyer, the defendant’s 
right to effective assistance of counsel has been compromised.97  A 
defendant has the right to provide advice to his counsel about his 
defense and it is within his rights “to supercede his lawyer altogether 
and conduct the trial himself.”98  Naturally, in order for the 
defendant to make decisions about these rights, and assist in his 
defense, he must be competent and not under the influence of 
 
 91 Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 485 (1978). 
 92 Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 344 (1970) (“Not only is it possible that the sight 
of shackles and gags might have a significant effect on the jury’s feelings about the 
defendant, but the use of this technique is itself something of [an] affront to the very 
dignity and decorum of judicial proceedings that the judge is seeking to uphold.”).  
In certain extreme situations though, the Court noted, “binding and gagging might 
possibly be the fairest and most reasonable way to handle” a disruptive defendant.  
Id. 
 93 425 U.S. 501 (1976). 
 94 Id. at 504-05 (stating no “essential state policy” was served by compelling the 
defendant’s dress, the Court said, “[t]he actual impact of a particular practice on the 
judgment of jurors cannot always be fully determined,” so courts “must do the best 
they can to evaluate the likely effects of a particular procedure, based on reason, 
principle, and common human experience”). 
 95 See infra note 115 and accompanying text. 
 96 See Elizabeth A. Schmidtlein, Note, Riggins v. Nevada: The Accused’s Right to 
“Just Say No” to Antipsychotic Drugs?, 10 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 541, 544 
(1994) (quoting Riggins, 504 U.S. at 1819 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting doctor 
who examined Riggins at his competency hearing). 
 97 Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964); Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 
80 (1976). 
 98 See Ziegelmueller, supra note 88, at 846 (citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 
806, 816 (1975) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 106 (1934))). 
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debilitating drugs so he can understand the nature of the 
proceedings that surround him.99 
Clearly these Sixth Amendment concerns are implicated when 
defendants are under the influence of antipsychotic drugs.  When 
patients undergo antipsychotic treatment, their personalities change 
dramaticallyoverwrought patients become lethargic, emotional 
outbursts cease as the “synthetically sane” patient enters a zombie-like 
trance.100  Commentators state that this “exercise of ‘duress on [a] 
witness’ mind [so] as to preclude him from making a free and 
voluntary choice’ regarding his testimony is an infringement on a 
defendant’s right to a fair trial.”101 
B. Effects of Antipsychotic Drugs 
It is important to discuss different antipsychotic drugs and the 
problematic tendencies that oftentimes result from their 
administration.  Psychotropic drugs, including antipsychotics, 
tranquilizers, sedatives, and hypnotics, affect the mental processes by 
altering an individual’s brain chemical balance, which hopefully 
affects the cognitive process in a remedial way.102  Although the 
medical world does not fully understand how the drugs combat 
psychosis, it is believed that the drugs manipulate dopamine levels 
produced in the brain.103  There is no agreement on what mental 
conditions are best treated by drugs,104 but it is agreed that the drugs 
only suppress, and do not cure mental illness, and that they provide 
no curative effect once they leave the blood stream.105 
Antipsychotics’ “effectiveness varies from condition to condition, 
symptom to symptom and patient to patient,” and because of this, 
psychiatrists face difficulty prescribing medications due to the 
inability to predict the drugs’ effect on a particular patient.106  A 
medication regimen, therefore, is usually prescribed based on custom 
within the profession, rather than through calculated analysis.107  
 
 99 See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171-73 (1975). 
 100 See Feeman, supra note 86, at 699. 
 101 See Ziegelmueller, supra note 88, at 846-47 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. VI); 
Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95, 98 (1972). 
 102 See William M. Brooks, Reevaluating Substantive Due Process as a Source of Protection 
for Psychiatric Patients to Refuse Drugs, 31 IND. L. REV. 937, 945 (1998). 
 103 Id. 
 104 See Feeman, supra note 86, at 698. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. 
 107 Id. (citing Robert Plotkin, Limiting the Therapeutic Orgy: Mental Patients’ Right to 
Refuse Treatment, 72 NW. U. L. REV. 461, 461 (1977); Lawrence D. Gaughan & Lewis 
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Moreover, the patient’s appropriate dosage is a product of guesswork 
and trial and error with the administered amount increased until 
either there is a curative effect or toxic symptoms develop.108  Even 
then, any curative effect may be temporary because individuals’ drug 
responses vary over time,109 and when side effects present themselves, 
they sometimes persist for years after the medication is stopped.110 
Some common side effects of antipsychotic drugs are 
pronounced sedation, a condition occurring after the drugs 
chemically dull patients’ thought processes and flatten their 
emotional responses.111  Personalities change dramatically as a result 
of the medications; overwrought patients become lethargic, and 
emotional outbursts cease as the “synthetically sane” patient enters a 
zombie-like trance.112  This “chemical lobotomy,” a term coined by 
opponents of the drugs, forces patients to feel drowsy, disoriented, 
and unable to stay awake.113  Generally, the side effects can be 
characterized into two groups: extrapyramidal and non-neurological 
symptoms.114 
Within the extrapyramidal symptoms category, most of the 
disorders are extremely harmful, involving the medications’ effect on 
the brain’s extrapyramidal system, which is the part of the body’s 
involuntary nervous system that directs coordination of muscular 
movements.115  This classification contains five main disorders: tardive 
dyskinesia, parkinsonism, akathisia, dystonic reactions, and 
neuroleptic malignant syndrome.116 
 
H. La Rue, The Right of a Mental Patient to Refuse Antipsychotic Drugs in an Institution, 4 
LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 43, 47 (1978)). 
 108 See Feeman, supra note 86, at 698. 
 109 Id. at 699. 
 110 Id. at 700. 
 111 Id. at 699. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. 
 114 See Cichon, supra note 28, at 297-301; see also Brooks, supra note 102, at 947-
51.  Not all the side effects fit neatly into these two categories.  For example, there 
are many other minor side effects of antipsychotic drugs like blurred vision, dry 
mouth, and minor interference with sexual functioning.  Id. at 950.  Additionally, 
constipation, urinary retention, and eye and severe skin disorders, including major 
discoloration, have been noted.  See Schmidtlein, supra note 96, at 545.  Certain 
behavioral impairments have been noted to occur such as toxic confusion, insomnia, 
schizophrenic symptoms, and bizarre dreams.  Id.  It is easy to see how many of these 
behaviors and grotesque movements are embarrassing for the patient and the family 
to endure.  See Feeman, supra note 86, at 700. 
 115 See Cichon, supra note 28, at 300. 
 116 Id. 
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Tardive dyskinesia, the most damaging disorder, is an 
unpredictable, irreversible disorder that involves spastic body 
movements, ranging from lip smacking and involuntary pelvic 
movements, to difficulty in breathing, talking, and swallowing.117  
Parkinsonism’s victims resemble someone afflicted with Parkinson’s 
disease, showing a “‘mask-like face, drooling, muscle stiffness and 
rigidity.’”118  Akinesia, which is a subcategory of parkinsonism, is a 
socially debilitating side effect whose victims seem lethargic to the 
point that any intellectual interests, like communication and reading, 
become impossible.119  Akathisia, a disorder exhibiting symptoms 
including painful irritability, pacing, fidgeting, and the constant 
tapping of the feet is problematic in that patients reach such a point 
of extreme panic that it oftentimes displays symptoms worse than the 
underlying illness.120  Dystonic reactions, characterized by muscular 
 
 117 See Brooks, supra note 102, at 948-49; see also Feeman, supra note 86, at 700.  
Antipsychotic drugs oftentimes mask the symptoms of tardive dyskinesia—these 
symptoms may not expose themselves until the regimen is decreased or discontinued 
which is why doctors fail to diagnose this disorder almost ninety percent of the time.  
See Brooks, supra note 102, at 949 (quoting Kenneth A. Kessler & Jeremy Waletzky, 
Clinical Use of Antipsychotic, 138 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 202, 205 (1981)).  Studies indicate 
the prevalence of tardive dyskinesia approximately range from ten to fifty percent; 
the federal judiciary is also in disagreement but the Supreme Court in Harper has 
indicated the incidence of the disorder at ten to twenty-five percent while district 
courts, for example, Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979), have held the 
number as high as fifty-six percent.  See Brooks, supra note 102, at 949-50 (citing 
Rogers, 478 F. Supp. 1342; Harper, 494 U.S. 210). 
 118 See Brooks, supra note 102, at 948 (quoting Plotkin, supra note 107, at 475).  
Prevalence rates of parkinsonism are difficult to determine— studies have indicated 
that five to ninety percent of patients suffer from the disorder.  Id. 
 119 See Brooks, supra note 102, at 948; see also Cichon, supra note 28, at 301.  
Doctors note difficulty in diagnosing this disorder, mostly because the patient’s 
peaceful, apathetic state masks discomfort to the point where they will actually deny 
difficulties.  Around thirty-five percent on certain medications develop akinesia and 
anti-parkinsonian drugs assist, but usually will never offer curative effects to the 
disorder.  See Cichon, supra note 28, at 301. 
 120 See Cichon, supra note 28, at 301-02.  Akathisia, which has been linked to 
suicidal and homicidal behavior, is difficult to diagnose and the prevalence of the 
side effect is staggering.  Id.; see also Brooks, supra note 102, at 947-48 (stating that 
“[p]sychiatrists often fail to diagnose akathesia as it may be impossible to distinguish 
between akathesia and psychotic excitement.  Because psychiatrists often 
misinterpret symptoms of akathesia as a worsening of a patient’s psychiatric 
condition, physicians will react by increasing the dosage level of medication.”).  
Further, 
[o]ne early study found that forty-five percent of the patients observed 
experienced akathisia at one time or another.  A more recent study, 
however, indicates a much higher prevalence rate. After only one five 
milligram dose of haloperidol, sixty-four percent of the test group 
experienced akathisia, with twenty-two percent suffering a severe case.  
At the end of one week of treatment with a daily ten milligram dose, 
seventy-six percent of the patients experienced the impairment.  Sixty-
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spasms in the eyes, face, neck, and arms are severe short-term side 
effects, and most likely, these horrible symptoms would be present 
during the detainee’s trial.121  The last side effect within the 
extrapyramidal class is neuroleptic malignant syndrome, which 
produces symptoms ranging from elevated blood pressure, delirium, 
mutism, and in some cases, to coma.122 
The second group of characterized side effects is the non-
neurological disorders, which mostly involve sexual dysfunctions, 
blood, endocrine, and hormonal disorders.123  In males, sexual 
dysfunctions have ranged from impotence, inability to ejaculate, or to 
the more severe reversal of ejaculation into the bladder.124  Also, 
induced priapism can result, which is a sustained erection that occurs 
without stimulation.125  The erection, which is extremely painful, does 
not subside, oftentimes requiring emergency surgery.126  Endocrine 
and hormonal disorders have also been reported as non-neurological 
side effects, some including an increased appetite that leads to 
substantial weight gain.127  Females have been reported to experience 
irregularities in the menstrual cycle, sometimes resulting in infertility, 
as well as spontaneous lactation, and in males, breast enlargement 
can occur.128  In addition, skin disorders develop ranging from rashes 
to irreversible pigment discoloration.129 
Certain blood disorders, most notably dyscrasias, which are 
disorders resulting from toxic and/or allergic effects of certain drugs 
on the hematologic system, also fall within the non-neurological 
category.130  Agranulocytosis, a life-threatening decrease in infection-
destroying white blood cells, is the most serious blood dyscrasia and is 
 
three percent of another test group experienced akathisia after four 
weeks of treatment with a fixed dose of thiothixene. 
Cichon, supra note 28, at 302. 
 121 See Brooks, supra note 102, at 948. 
 122 Id. at 950.  Although approximately two percent of patients who use 
neuroleptic medication exhibit symptoms of this disorder out of the thousands 
suffering from it, death will result twenty to thirty percent of the time.  Id. at 951; see 
also Cichon, supra note 28, at 309-10. 
 123 See Cichon, supra note 28, at 298. 
 124 Id. 
 125 Id. 
 126 Id. 
 127 Id.; see Schmidtlein, supra note 96, at 545.   
 128 See Cichon, supra note 28, at 298; see also Schmidtlein, supra note 96, at 545.   
 129 See Cichon, supra note 28, at 298. 
 130 Id. 
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characterized by sore throat, fatigue, fever, jaundice, eye lesions, and 
skin discoloration.131 
Clearly, the ‘brutality of these side effects is apparent and it is no 
wonder why commentators maintain “‘even acutely disturbed patients 
might have good reason to refuse these drugs.’”132 
C. Sell Instructs the Government to Apply Harper before Sell and 
This is Unconstitutional Because it Ignores Detainees’ Sixth 
Amendment Rights in Favor of a Less Onerous Standard 
The Sell four-part test properly addresses Sixth Amendment 
concerns incident to the involuntarily administration of antipsychotic 
drugs to pre-trial detainees.  The Court makes reference to these 
concerns, first mentioned in Justice Kennedy’s Riggins concurrence, 
in the second prong of the Sell four-part test by stating lower courts 
“must conclude that involuntary medication will significantly further 
those concomitant state interests,” but also it “must find that 
administration of the drugs is substantially unlikely to have side 
effects that will interfere significantly with the defendant’s ability to 
assist counsel in conducting a trial defense, thereby rendering the 
trial unfair.”133 
Specifically, in Riggins, Justice Kennedy devoted eight pages to a 
discussion of his skepticism that the state will ever be able to 
demonstrate enough justification to allow involuntary medication to 
detainees to render them competent for trial.134  His skepticism is 
rooted in the drugs’ brutal side effects and their effects on detainees’ 
Sixth Amendment rights such as the “right to effective assistance of 
counsel, the rights to summon, to confront, and to cross-examine 
witnesses, and the right to testify on one’s own behalf or to remain 
silent without penalty for doing so.”135 
Even though the Sell Court should have discussed further, and 
perhaps even expanded on Justice Kennedy’s concerns, this 
Comment will assume the Court fully accepted Justice Kennedy’s 
 
 131 Id.; see Brooks, supra note 102, at 950. 
 132 See Brooks, supra note 102, at 951 (quoting Rennie v. Klein, 476 F. Supp. 1294, 
1299 (D.N.J. 1979)). 
 133 Sell, 539 U.S. at 181 (citing Riggins, 504 U.S. at 142-45 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring)) (emphasis in original). 
 134 Riggins, 504 U.S. at 138-39 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[A]bsent an 
extraordinary showing by the State, the Due Process Clause prohibits prosecuting 
officials from administering involuntary doses of antipsychotic medicines for 
purposes of rendering the accused competent for trial . . . .”). 
 135 Id. at 139-40 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 
171-72 (1975)). 
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Riggins concurrence in prong two of the Sell standard.136  This 
endorsement, although cursory, evidences the fact that the Court 
recognized these Sixth Amendment concerns and the brutal side 
effects of the drugs.  What is problematic with Sell, however, is the 
Court’s accompanying suggestion that it should first consider 
whether involuntary administration of drugs is permissible under 
Harper for a dangerous detainee. 
The Sell Court’s instruction urging lower courts to apply Harper 
before the Sell standard is problematic because it ignores vital Sixth 
Amendment concerns.  A commentator was quick to question 
whether the fact that Harper was in prison after a conviction was a 
factor the Court took into account in the Harper analysis.137  In Sell, 
however, there is no mention of criminal conviction being a pre-
requisite to forcefully administering antipsychotics to detainees 
under the Harper “dangerousness” grounds.138  What was overlooked 
with this instruction is that the Harper standard was created for 
situations involving post-conviction prison inmates.139  Obviously, in 
those situations, Sixth Amendment fair trial protections are not 
implicated anymore.  In contrast, individuals like the subjects in Sell 
and Riggins are pre-trial detainees, so Sixth Amendment trial 
protections still apply, being implicated once post formal initiation of 
the adversarial process began. 
In Riggins, Justice Kennedy spoke out about these constitutional 
issues, focusing primarily on the drugs’ inherent risks.140  The 
 
 136 See Sell, 539 U.S. at 181 (citing Riggins, 504 U.S. at 142-45 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring)). 
 137 See generally Cichon supra note 28, at 288-89. 
 138 The record at the federal magistrate’s hearing focused primarily on Sell’s 
“dangerousness” and the Court was concerned with the sparse discussion about the 
factors articulated in the new four-part test.  Id. at 185.  Moreover, the Supreme 
Court noted problematic the hearing record’s absence of meaningful discussion 
about the drugs’ side effects, the drugs’ adverse effects on communication with 
counsel, the drugs’ chances of sedating the defendant, and the drugs’ impact on 
quelling detainees’ expressive emotions after courtroom trial developments, stating 
these concerns tend to undermine the fairness of trial, all of which are 
considerations under the new Sell standard.  Id. at 185 (citing Riggins, 504 U.S. 127 at 
142-45 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).  Additionally, the Court questioned why the lower 
court did not address the fact that Sell would not be a threat to the community 
because he had already been confined at the Medical Center and will continue to be 
held there if he does not take the medication.  Sell, 539 U.S. at 186.  For these 
reasons, the majority vacated and remanded the Eight Circuit’s judgment so the 
government could pursue forced medication on either the Sell articulated factors, 
the Harper dangerousness grounds, or both.  Id. 
 139 Harper, 494 U.S. at 221-22. 
 140 See Ziegelmueller, supra note 88, at 855 (citing Riggins, 504 U.S. at 1818 
(Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
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defendant’s demeanor, both on the witness stand and at counsel 
table, is affected due to the drugs’ side effects, which implicate Sixth 
Amendment Confrontation Clause arguments.141  Further, the side 
effects potentially prejudice the accused by interfering with the 
attorney-client relationship.142  Justice Kennedy believed that the state 
has an interest in synthetically altering the detainee’s competence 
level, but if “‘the defendant cannot be tried without his demeanor 
being affected in this substantial way by involuntary treatment, in 
[his] view the Constitution requires that society bear this cost’” of 
civil commitment.143  The Sell standard adopts these views. But clearly, 
the Court’s accompanying instruction bypassing these concerns in 
favor of a less onerous standard is anathema to detainees’ Sixth 
Amendment rights.  The Sell Court seemingly overlooked this 
important aspect and, therefore, was wrong to instruct governments 
to attempt to involuntarily medicate any pre-trial detainee, dangerous 
or not, under Harper at all. 
The Sell Court should have limited Harper’s application to 
dangerous, post-conviction detainees and should have required Sell to 
be applied to all pre-trial detainees.  Only then can all pre-trial 
detainees be guaranteed to have their Sixth Amendment trial rights 
weighed against the oftentimes devastating side effects of the drugs 
the government is attempting to forcefully administer to them before 
they are put on trial for frequently serious charges, even some 
punishable by death.  To instruct otherwise, as the Sell Court has 
done, favors deprivation of mentally ill individuals’ constitutional 
rights in favor of achieving an unconstitutional result—an unfair trial, 
unfair conviction, and inevitably, an unfair sentence. 
CONCLUSION 
The involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication to 
render detainees competent to stand trial is an extremely 
controversial and troubling issue.144  For many years, courts have 
 
 141 Id. at 855-56 (citing Riggins, 504 U.S. at 1818 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).  This 
is even more important in a capital case where the defendant’s demeanor will affect 
the jury’s character assessment in determining whether the defendant lives or dies.  
Id. 
 142 Id. at 856 (citing Riggins, 504 U.S. at 1820 (Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
 143 Id. (quoting Riggins, 504 U.S. at 1820 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (Justice 
Kennedy would allow forced medication “only when the State can show that 
involuntary treatment does not cause alterations [in demeanor] . . . .”). 
 144 See Aaron M. Nance, Comment, Balking at Buying What the Eight Circuit is Sell-
ing: United States v. Sell and the Involuntary Medication of Incompetent, Non-Dangerous, 
Pretrial Detainees Cloaked with the Presumption of Innocence, 71 UMKC L. REV. 685, 715 
(2003). 
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struggled and failed to formulate tests that strike the appropriate 
balance between protecting individuals’ rights while respecting the 
State’s interest in prosecuting defendants.145  In Sell, the Court 
granted certiorari intending to clear up years of confusion within the 
forced medication realm, but in reality, failed because the Court 
instructs governments to attempt to involuntarily medicate any pre-
trial detainee, dangerous or not, under Harper first, before applying 
Sell.  This instruction favors depriving mentally ill individuals’ Sixth 
Amendment rights in favor of achieving an unconstitutional result—
an unfair trial, unfair conviction, and inevitably, an unfair sentence.  
The Sell Court should have limited Harper’s application to dangerous, 
post-conviction detainees, and should have required Sell to be applied 
to all pre-trial detainees—only then can the detainees’ Sixth 
Amendment rights be properly accounted for. 
 
 
 
 145 Id. at 716.  Prior to Sell, then-student (later Professor) Aaron Nance wrote: 
Ultimately, the issue of “forced injection” appears to be as novel, and 
unsettled, as it was a decade ago when the Supreme Court handed 
down the enigma of Riggins v. Nevada.  The Court will have to take a 
“forced injection” case at some point, which may be sooner rather than 
later, and only then will we know whether sacrificing a defendant’s 
individual rights in the name of criminal justice is worth the price of all 
the new, and possibly more difficult, legal questions that practice 
naturally generates. 
Id. 
